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Abstract—The increase in network connectivity has also re-
sulted in several high-profile attacks on cyber-physical systems.
An attacker that manages to access a local network could remotely
affect control performance by tampering with sensor measure-
ments delivered to the controller. Recent results have shown that
with network-based attacks, such as Man-in-the-Middle attacks,
the attacker can introduce an unbounded state estimation error
if measurements from a suitable subset of sensors contain false
data when delivered to the controller. While these attacks can
be addressed with the standard cryptographic tools that ensure
data integrity, their continuous use would introduce significant
communication and computation overhead. Consequently, we
study effects of intermittent data integrity guarantees on system
performance under stealthy attacks. We consider linear estima-
tors equipped with a general type of residual-based intrusion
detectors (including χ2 and SPRT detectors), and show that
even when integrity of sensor measurements is enforced only
intermittently, the attack impact is significantly limited; specif-
ically, the state estimation error is bounded or the attacker
cannot remain stealthy. Furthermore, we present methods to:
(1) evaluate the effects of any given integrity enforcement policy
in terms of reachable state-estimation errors for any type of
stealthy attacks, and (2) design an enforcement policy that
provides the desired estimation error guarantees under attack.
Finally, on three automotive case studies we show that even with
less than 10% of authenticated messages we can ensure satisfiable
control performance in the presence of attacks.
Index Terms—Attack-resilient state estimation, attack detec-
tion, Kalman filtering, cyber-physical systems security, linear sys-
tems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several high-profile incidents have recently exposed vulner-
abilities of cyber-physical systems (CPS) and drawn attention
to the challenges of providing security guarantees as part of
their design. These incidents cover a wide range of application
domains and system complexity, from attacks on large-scale
infrastructure such as the 2016 breach of Ukrainian power-
grid [38], to the StuxNet virus attack on an industrial SCADA
system [13], as well as attacks on controllers in modern cars
(e.g., [3]) and unmanned arial vehicles [29]
There are several reasons for such number of security related
incidents affecting control of CPS. The tight interaction be-
tween information technology and physical world has greatly
increased the attack vector space. For instance, an adversarial
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signal can be injected into measurements obtained from a sen-
sor, using non-invasive attacks that modify the sensor’s physi-
cal environment; as shown in attacks on GPS-based navigation
systems [37], [9]. Even more important reason is network
connectivity that is prevalent in CPS. An attacker that manages
to access a local control network could remotely affect control
performance by tampering with sensor measurements and
actuator commands in order to force the plant into any desired
state, as illustrated in [32]. From the controls perspective,
attacks over an internal system network, such as the Man-in-
the-Middle (MitM) attacks where the attacker inserts messages
anywhere in the sensors→controllers→actuators pathway, can
be modeled as additional malicious signals injected into the
control loop via the system’s sensors and actuators [35].
While the interaction with the physical world introduces
new attack surfaces, it also provides opportunities to improve
system resilience agains attacks. The use of control techniques
that employ a physical model of the system’s dynamics for
attack detection and attack-resilient state estimation has drawn
significant attention in recent years (e.g., [35], [36], [27], [4],
[34], [24], [1], [26], [25], [30], and a recent survey [17]). One
line of work is based on the use of unknown input observers
(e.g., [34], [27]) and non-convex optimization for resilient
estimation (e.g., [4], [25]), while another focuses on attack-
detection and estimation guarantees in systems with standard
Kalman filter-based state estimators (e.g., [22], [21], [11],
[12], [24], [23], [10]). In the later works, estimation residue-
based failure detectors, such as χ2 [22], [23] and sequential
probability ratio test (SPRT) detectors [12], are employed
for intrusion detection. Still, irrelevant of the utilized attack
detection mechanism, after compromising a suitable subset of
sensors, an intelligent attacker can significantly degrade con-
trol performance while remaining undetected (i.e., stealthy).
For instance, for resilient state estimation techniques as in [4],
[25], measurements from at least half of the sensors should
not be tampered with [4], [31], while [22], [11] capture
attack requirements for Kalman filter-based estimators. The
reason for such conservative results lies in the common initial
assumption that once a sensor or its communication to the
estimator is compromised, all values received from the sensors
can be potentially corrupted – i.e., integrity of the data received
from these sensors cannot be guaranteed.
On the other hand, most of network-based attacks, includ-
ing MitM attacks, can be avoided with the use of standard
cryptographic tools. For example, to authenticate data and
ensure integrity of received communication packets, a common
approach is to add a message authentication code (MAC) to
the transmitted sensor measurements. Therefore, data integrity
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2Fig. 1. Communication schedule for periodic messages (with period Ts = 2)
from two sensors over a shared network: (a) a feasible schedule for non-
authenticated messages (i.e., when MAC bits are not attached to transmitted
packets); (b) there is no feasible schedule when all messages are authenticated;
and (c) if data integrity is only intermittently enforced (e.g., by adding MAC
bits only to every other packet), scheduling of the messages becomes feasible.
requirements can be imposed by the continuous use of MACs
in all transmissions from a sufficient subset of sensors. How-
ever, the overhead caused by the continuous computation and
communication of authentication codes can limit their use.
For instance, adding MAC bits to networked control systems
that employ Controller Area Networks (CAN) may not be
feasible due to the message length limitation (e.g., only 64
payload bits per packet in the basic CAN protocol), while
splitting them into several communication packets significantly
increases the message transmission time [16]. To illustrate this,
consider two sensors periodically transmitting measurements
over a shared network. As presented in Figure 1(a), without
authentication (i.e., if transmitted data contain no MAC bits)
the communication packets will be schedulable but the system
would be vulnerable to false-data injection attacks. Yet, if all
measurements from both sensors are authenticated, with the
increase in the packet size due to authentication overhead, it
is not possible to schedule transmissions from both sensors in
every communication frame (Figure 1(b)). Finally, a feasible
schedule exists if MAC bits are attached to every other
measurement packet transmitted by each sensor (Figure 1(c)).
Consequently, in this paper we focus on state estimation in
systems with intermittent data integrity guarantees for sensor
measurements delivered to the estimator. Specifically, we
study the performance of linear filters equipped with residual-
based intrusion detectors in the presence of attacks on sensor
measurements. We build on the system model from [22], [11],
[23] by capturing that the use of authentication mechanisms
in intermittent time-points ensures that sensor measurements
received at these points are valid. To keep our discussion and
results general, we consider a wide class of detection functions
that encompasses commonly used detectors, including χ2
and SPRT detectors. We show that even when integrity of
communicated sensor data is enforced only intermittently and
the attacker is fully aware of the times of the enforcement, the
attack impact gets significantly limited; concretely, either the
state estimation error remains bounded or the attacker cannot
remain stealthy. This holds even when communication from
all sensors to the estimator can be compromised as well as
in any other case where otherwise (i.e., without integrity en-
forcements) an unbounded estimation error can be introduced.
Furthermore, to facilitate the use of intermittent data in-
tegrity enforcement for control of CPS in the presence of
network-based attacks, we introduce an analysis and design
framework that addresses two challenges. First, we introduce
techniques to evaluate the effects of any given integrity en-
forcement policy in terms of reachable state-estimation errors
for any type of stealthy attacks. Note that methods to evaluate
potential state estimation errors due to attacks are considered
in [23], [12], [22]. However, given that the previous work
considers system architectures without intermittent use of
authentication, these techniques result in overly conservative
estimates of reachable regions or they cannot capture the
effects of intermittent integrity guarantees on the estimation
error. Second, we present a method to design an enforcement
policy that provides the desired estimation error guarantees
for any attack signal inserted via compromised sensors. The
developed framework also facilitates tradeoff analysis between
the allowed estimation error and the rate at which data integrity
should be enforced – i.e., the required system resources such
as communication bandwidth as we have presented in [14].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the problem, including the system and attack
models. In Section III, we analyze the impact of stealthy
attacks in systems without integrity enforcements and formally
define intermittent integrity enforcement policies. Section IV
focuses on state estimation guarantees when data integrity is at
least intermittently enforced. We then introduce a methodology
to analyze effects of integrity enforcement policies as well
as design suitable policies that ensure the desired estimation
error even in the presence of attacks (Section V). Finally, in
Section VI, we present case studies that illustrate effectiveness
of our approach, before providing final remarks in Section VII.
A. Notation and Terminology
The transpose of matrix A is specified as AT , while the
ith element of a vector xk is denoted by xk,i. Moore-Penrose
pseudoinverse of matrix A is denoted as A†. In addition, ‖A‖i
denotes the i-norm of a matrix A and, for a positive definite
matrix Q, ‖∆zk‖Q−1 = ‖Q−1/2∆zk‖2. null(A) denotes the
null space of the matrix. Also, diag (·) indicates a square
matrix with the quantities inside the brackets on the diagonal,
and zeros elsewhere, while BlckDiag (·) denotes a block-
diagonal operator. We denote positive definite and positive
semidefinite matrix A as A  0 and A < 0, respectively,
while det(A) stands for the determinant of the matrix. Also, Ip
denotes the p-dimensional identity matrix, and 0p×q denotes
p×q matrix of zeroes. We use R,N and N0 to denote the sets of
reals, natural numbers and nonnegative integers, respectively.
As most of our analysis considers bounded-input systems, we
refer to any eigenvalue λ as unstable eigenvalue if |λ| ≥ 1.
For a set S, we use |S| to denote the cardinality (i.e., size)
of the set. In addition, for a set K ⊂ S , with K{ we denote
the complement set of K with respect to S – i.e., K{ = S \K.
Projection vector iTj denotes the row vector (of the appropriate
size) with a 1 in its jth position being the only nonzero
element of the vector. For a vector y ∈ Rp, we use PKy
to denote the projection from the set S = {1, ..., p} to set
K (K ⊆ S) by keeping only elements of y with indices
from K.1 Finally, the support of the vector v ∈ Rp is the
set supp(v) = {i | vi 6= 0} ⊆ {1, 2, ..., p}.
1Formally, PK =
[
ik1 |...|ik|K|
]T , where K = {sk1 , ..., sk|K|} ⊆ S and
k1 < k2 < ... < k|K|.
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Fig. 2. System architecture – by launching Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks,
the attacker can inject adversarial signals into plant measurements obtained
from system sensors.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Before introducing the problem formulation, we describe the
considered system and its architecture (shown in Figure 2), as
well as the attacker model.
A. System Model without Attacks
We consider an observable linear-time invariant (LTI) sys-
tem whose evolution without attacks can be represented as
xk+1 = Axk + Buk + wk
yk = Cxk + vk
(1)
where xk ∈ Rn and uk ∈ Rm denote the plant’s state and
input vectors, at time k, while the plant’s output vector yk ∈
Rp contains measurements provided by p sensors from the set
S = {s1, s2, ..., sp}. Accordingly, the matrices A,B and C
have suitable dimensions. Also, w ∈ Rn and v ∈ Rp denote
the process and measurement noise; we assume that x0, wk,
and vk are independent Gaussian random variables.
Furthermore, the system is equipped with an estimator in the
form of a Kalman filter. Given that the Kalman gain usually
converges in only a few steps, to simplify the notation we
assume that the system is in steady state before the attack.
Hence, the Kalman filter estimate xˆk is updated as
xˆk+1 = Axˆk + Buk + K(yk+1 −C(Axˆk + Buk)) (2)
K = ΣCT (CΣCT + R)−1, (3)
where Σ is the estimation error covariance matrix, and R is
the sensor noise covariance matrix. Also, the residue zk ∈ Rp
at time k and its covariance matrix Q are defined as
zk = yk −C(Axˆk−1 + Buk−1),
Q = E{zkzTk } = CΣCT + R.
(4)
Finally, the state estimation error ek is defined as the difference
between the plant’s state xk and Kalman filter estimate xˆk as
ek = xk − xˆk. (5)
In addition to the estimator, we assume that the system is
equipped with an intrusion detector. We consider a general
case where the detection function gk of the intrusion detector
is defined as
gk =
k∑
i=k−T+1
c(i−k+T )ziTQ−1zi. (6)
Here, T is the length of the detector’s time window, and ci for
i = 1, ..., T are predefined non-negative coefficients, with cT
being strictly positive. The above formulation captures both
fixed window size detectors, where T is a constant, as well
as detectors where the time window size T satisfies T = k.
Also, the definition of the detection function gk covers a wide
variety of commonly used intrusion detectors, such as χ2 and
sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) detectors previously
considered in these scenarios [20], [18], [23], [19], [11], [12].
The alarm is triggered when the value of the detection function
gk satisfies that
gk > threshold, (7)
and the probability of the alarm at time k can be captured as
βk = P (gk > threshold). (8)
B. Attack Model
We assume that the attacker is capable of launching MitM
attacks on communication channels between a subset of the
plant’s sensors K ⊆ S and the estimator; for instance, by se-
cretly relaying corresponding altered communication packets.
However, we do not assume that the set K is known to the
system or system designers. Thus, to capture the attacker’s
impact on the system, the system model from (1) becomes
xak+1 = Ax
a
k + Bu
a
k + wk
yak = Cx
a
k + vk + ak.
(9)
Here, xak and y
a
k denote the state and plant outputs in the
presence of attacks, from the perspective of the estimator, since
in the general case they differ from the plant’s state and outputs
of the non-compromised system. In addition, ak denotes the
signals injected by the attacker at time k starting from k = 1
(i.e., a0 = 0);2 to model MitM attacks on communication
between the sensors from set K and the estimator, we assume
that ak is a sparse vector from Rp with support in the set K
– i.e., ak,i = 0 for all i ∈ KC and k > 0.3
We consider the following threat model.
(1) The attacker has full knowledge of the system – in addition
to knowing the dynamical model of the plant, employed
Kalman filter, and detector, the attacker is aware of all potential
security mechanism used in communication. Specifically, we
consider systems that use standard methods for message
authentication to ensure data integrity, and assume that the
attacker is aware at which time points data integrity will
be enforced. Thus, to avoid being detected, the attacker will
not launch attacks in these steps and will also take into
account these integrity enforcements in planning its attacks (as
described in Section III).4 Since we model our system such
that attacks start at k = 1, this further implies that at k = 1
2More details about why the attacker does not insert attack at step k = 0
can be found in Remark 1.
3Although a sensor itself may not be directly compromised with MitM
attacks, but rather communication between the sensor and estimator, we will
also refer to these sensors are compromised sensors. In addition, in this
work we sometimes abuse the notation by using K to denote both the set
of compromised sensors and the set of indices of the compromised sensors.
4In Section IV, we will also consider the case where the attacker has limited
knowledge of the system’s use of security mechanisms.
4data integrity is not enforced, as otherwise the attacker would
not be able to insert false data.
(2) The attacker has the required computation power to
calculate suitable attack signals, while planning ahead as
needed. (S)he also has the ability to inject any signal using
communication packets mimicking sensors from the set K,
except at times when data integrity is enforced. For instance,
when MACs are used to ensure data integrity and authen-
ticity of communication packets, our assumption is that the
attacker does not know the shared secret key used to generate
the MACs.
The goal of the attacker is to design attack signal ak such
that it maximizes the error of state estimation while ensuring
that the attack remains stealthy. To formally capture this
objective and the stealthiness constraint, we denote the state
estimation, residue, and estimation error of the compromised
system by xˆak, z
a
k, and e
a
k, respectively. Thus, the attacker’s
aim is to maximize eak, while ensuring that the increase in the
probability of alarm is not significant. We also define as
∆ek = e
a
k − ek, ∆zk = zak − zk,
the change in the estimation error and residue, respectively,
caused by the attacks. From (1) and (9), the evolution of these
signals can be captured as a dynamical system Ξ of the form
∆ek+1 = (A−KCA)∆ek −Kak+1, (10)
∆zk = CA∆ek−1 + ak, (11)
with ∆e0 = 0.
Remark 1. From the above equations, the first attack vector
to affect the change in estimation error is a1. Thus, without
loss of generality, we assume that the attack starts at k = 1
(i.e., ai = 0, for all i ≤ 0). This also implies that ∆z0 = 0.
Note that the above dynamical system is noiseless (and
deterministic), with input ak controlled by the attacker. There-
fore, since E[ek] = 0 for the non-compromised system in
steady state, it follows that
∆ek = E[∆ek] = E[e
a
k]. (12)
Given that ∆ek provides expectation of the state estimation
error under the attack, this signal can be used to evaluate the
impact that the attacker has on the system.5 Thus, we specify
the objective of the attacker as to maximize the expected state
estimation error (e.g., ‖∆ek‖2). This is additionally justified
by the fact that since ak is controlled by the attacker (i.e., de-
terministic to simplify of our presentation), which implies
Cov(eak) = Cov(ek) = Σ. (13)
To capture the attacker’s stealthiness requirements, we use
the probability of alarm in the presence of an attack
βak = P (g
a
k > threshold), where (14)
gak =
k∑
i=k−T +1
c(i−k+T )zai
TQ−1zai . (15)
5For this reason, and to simplify our presentation, in the rest of the paper we
will sometimes refer to ∆ek as the (expected) state estimation error instead
of the change of the state estimation error caused by attacks.
Therefore, to ensure that attacks remain stealthy, the attacker’s
stealthiness constraint in each step k is to maintain
βak ≤ βk + ε, (16)
for a small predefined value of ε > 0.
C. Problem Formulation
As we will present in the next section, for a large class
of systems, a stealthy attacker can easily introduce an un-
bounded state estimation error by compromising communi-
cation between some of the sensors and the estimator. On
the other hand, existing communication protocols commonly
incorporate security mechanisms (e.g., MAC) that can ensure
integrity of delivered sensor measurements. Specifically, this
means that the system could enforce ak,i = 0 for some
sensor si, or ak = 0 if integrity for all transmitted sensor
measurements is enforced at some time-step k. However, as
we previously described, the integrity enforcement comes at
additional communication and computation cost, effectively
preventing their continuous use in resource constrained CPS.
Consequently, we focus on the problem of evaluating the
impact of stealthy attacks in systems with intermittent (i.e., oc-
casional) use of data integrity enforcement mechanisms.6
Specifically, we will address the following problems:
• Can the attacker introduce unbounded state estimation
errors in systems with intermittent integrity guarantees?
• How to efficiently evaluate the impact of intermittent
integrity enforcement policies on the induced state es-
timation errors in the presence of a stealthy attacker?
• How to design a non-overly conservative development
framework that incorporates guarantees for estimation
degradation under attacks into design of suitable integrity
enforcement policies?
III. IMPACT OF STEALTHY ATTACKS ON STATE
ESTIMATION ERROR
To capture the impact of stealthy attacks on the system, we
start with the following definition.
Definition 1. The set of all stealthy attacks up to time k is
Ak = {a1..k|βak′ ≤ βk′ + ε, ∀k′, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k}, (17)
where a1..k = [aT1 . . .a
T
k ]
T .
When reasoning about a set of reachable state estimation
errors eak due to stealthy attacks from Ak, we have to also take
into account the variability of the estimation error. From (13),
we can define a specific region that will contain the error eak
with a desired probability. Therefore, we introduce the follow-
ing definition.
Definition 2. The k-reachable region Rk of the state estima-
tion error under the attack (i.e., eak) is the set
Rk =
{
e ∈ Rn ee
T 4 E[eak]E[eak]T + γCov(eak),
eak = e
a
k(a1..k), a1..k ∈ Ak
}
.
(18)
6Formal definition of such policies are presented in the next section.
5Furthermore, the global reachable region R of the state
estimation error eak is the set
R =
∞⋃
k=1
Rk. (19)
Here, γ is a design parameter directly related to the desired
confidence that eak belongs to the reachable region. Effectively,
the setRk captures the set of state estimation errors that can be
reached in kth step due to the injected malicious signal, while
R captures the set of all reachable state estimation errors. To
assess vulnerability of the system, a critical characteristic of
R is boundedness – whether a stealthy attacker can introduce
unbounded estimation errors. To simplify the boundedness
analysis of R, we start with the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let gk = zTkQ−1zk be the detector function.
Then, for any ε > 0, such that ε ≤ 1−βk, there exists a unique
α > 0 such that βak ≤ βk + ε if and only if ‖∆zk‖Q−1 ≤ α.
Proof. In the case without attacks, in steady-state gk has χ2
distribution with p degrees of freedom, since the residue zk is
zero-mean (E[zk] = 0) with covariance matrix Q = CΣCT+
R [8], [6]. Furthermore, from (10) and (11), ∆zk = zak −
zk, is output of a deterministic system controlled by a1..k,
and thus zak is a non-zero mean with covariance matrix Q –
i.e., the attacker is only influencing the ∆zk = E[zak− zk] =
E[zak]. Therefore, g
a
k = z
a
k
TQ−1zak will have a non-central
χ2 distribution with p degrees of freedom; the non-centrality
parameter of this distribution will be λ = ‖∆zk‖2Q−1 [6].
Let h be the threshold for the detector in (7). The alarm
probabilities βk = 1 − P (gk ≤ h) and βak = 1 − P (gak ≤ h)
can be computed from the distributions for gk and gak as
βk = 1− Fχ2(h, p), βak = 1− Fncχ2(h; p, λ),
where Fχ2(h, p) and Fncχ2(h; p, λ) are cumulative distribution
functions of χ2 and noncentralized χ2, respectfully, at h, with
p degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter λ. Since p
and h are fixed by the system design, it follows that βk will
be a constant, and βak will be a function of λ.
Consider ε = βak − βk. This means that
ε = 1− Fncχ2(h; p, λ)− βk. (20)
The probability distribution function of non-central χ2 distri-
bution is smooth (thus making Fncχ2(h; p, λ) smooth), and
Fncχ2(h; p, λ) is a decreasing function of λ [6]. Hence, it
follows that for any ε there will exist exactly one
√
λ =
‖∆zk‖Q−1 = α such that (20) is satisfied. Furthermore,
for any ε′ that is lower than ε, the corresponding
√
λ′ =
‖∆zk‖Q−1 from (20) has to be lower than α, and vice versa,
which concludes the proof.
Since the bound α for ‖∆zk‖Q−1 in Theorem 1 depends on
ε, h and the fact that the χ2 detector with p degrees of freedom
is used, we will denote such value as α = αχ2(ε, p, h).
Remark 2. Related results from [20], [23], focus only on the
detection function gk = zTkQ
−1zk and show only sufficient
conditions for stealthy attacks – i.e., that in this case from a
robustness condition ‖∆zk‖Q−1 ≤ α it follows that the the
stealthiness condition βak ≤ β + ε is satisfied. However, the
equivalence between conditions ‖∆zk‖Q−1 ≤ α and βak ≤
β+ε will enable us to reduce conservativeness of our analysis
as well as analyze boundness of the reachability region for the
general type of detection functions from (15), by allowing us
to employ both conditions interchangeably.
From Definition 1 and Theorem 1 the following result holds.
Corollary 1. For the detection function gk = zTkQ−1zk, there
exists α > 0 such that the set of all stealthy attacks satisfies
Ak = {a1..k|‖∆zk′‖Q−1 ≤ α, ∀k′, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k}. (21)
The previous results introduce an equivalent ‘robustness-
based’ representation for the set of stealthy attacks in systems
where χ2 detectors are used. They also provide a foundation
to consider the more general formulation (15) for the detector
function. We start with the following results characterizing
over- and under-approximations of the set Ak in such case,
also using suitable ’robustness-based’ representations of the
stealthiness condition. By showing that reachable estimation
error regions are bounded for these sets of attacks, we will be
able to reason whether the reachable region of state estimation
errors is bounded for attacks from the set Ak.
Lemma 1. For a system with the detector function gak of
the form from (15), the set of all stealthy attacks Ak can be
underapproximated by the set
Ak = {a1..k|‖∆zk′‖Q−1 ≤ α, ∀k′, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k} (22)
(i.e., Ak ⊆ Ak), where α = αχ2(ε, T p, h/cmax)/
√T .
In essence, the lemma states that if ‖∆zk‖Q−1 ≤ α holds,
then gak ≤ h for the general detection function from (15) is
satisfied with probability that is lower than or equal to βk+ε.
Proof. Consider an attack sequence a1..k ∈ Ak and the
resulting evolution of the system from (10) and (11), with
‖∆zk′‖Q−1 ≤ α, for all k′, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k. Then,
k∑
i=k−T+1
‖∆zi‖2Q−1 ≤
k∑
i=k−T+1
α2 = α2χ2(ε, T p, h). (23)
In addition, we define cmax = max(c1, . . . , cT ) and
gak =
k∑
i=k−T+1
cmaxz
a
i
TQ−1zai , (24)
as well as βak = P (g
a
k > h). From (24), g
a
k is a scaled sum
of noncentral χ2 distributions with p degrees of freedom, so
gak/cmax will have the noncentral χ
2 distribution with pT
degrees of freedom and the central moment equal to
λ =
k∑
i=k−T+1
‖∆zi‖2Q−1 . (25)
Since βak = P (g
a
k > h) = P (g
a
k/cmax > h/cmax),
following the proof of Theorem 1 for the gak/cmax detection
6function we have that βak ≤ βk + ε is satisfied if and only if√
λ ≤ αχ2(ε, pT , h/cmax). That is, using (25)(
βak ≤ βk + ε
)
⇔
k∑
i=k−T+1
‖∆zi‖2Q−1 ≤ α2χ2(ε, pT , h/cmax).
(26)
Since (23) follows from the condition of the theorem,
from (26) we have that βak ≤ βk + ε is satisfied. From (24)
we have that gak ≤ gak , meaning that βak ≤ βak . Thus,(
βak ≤ βk + ε
)
holds , and a1..k ∈ Ak (i.e., Ak ⊆ Ak).
Lemma 2. For a system with the detector function gak of the
form from (15), the set of all stealthy attacks at time k, Ak,
can be overapproximated by the set
Ak = {a1..k|‖∆zk′‖Q−1 ≤ α, ∀k′, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k}, (27)
(i.e., Ak ⊇ Ak), where α = αχ2(ε, p, h/cT ).
Proof. Consider an attack sequence a1..k ∈ Ak with the
detector function gak from (15). Let g
a
k = cT z
a
k
TQ−1zak. Since
gak ≤ gak it follows that βak = P (gak > h) ≤ βak , where βak
is defined as in (14). Since a1..k are stealthy, it follows that
βak ≤ βk + ε, and thus βak ≤ βk + ε holds.
On the other hand, the function gak/cT has the χ
2 dis-
tribution; by following the proof of Theorem 1 for gak/cT
we have that βak ≤ βk + ε is satisfied if and only if
‖∆zk‖Q−1 ≤ α = αχ2(ε, p, h/cT ). Therefore, we have that
βak′ ≤ βk′+ε implies ‖∆zk′‖Q−1 ≤ α, k′ = 1, ..., k, meaning
that a1..k ∈ Ak (i.e., Ak ⊆ Ak).
Remark 3. The previous lemmas also hold for the detection
function gk =
∑k
i=1 ckz
T
i Q
−1zi; this can be shown by
replacing T with k in the previous analysis, since it would
not affect their proofs. In essence, this means that these results
hold for both windowed detectors and SPRT detectors – SPRT
detectors are explored in detail in Section V.
Lemmas 1 and 2 introduce attack sets Ak and Ak for which
the attack constraints are captured as robustness bounds on
‖∆zk‖Q−1 instead of probabilities of attack detection, and for
which Ak ⊆ Ak ⊆ Ak. Hence, to analyze impact of stealthy
attacks, we can consider the effects of attacks that have to
maintain ‖∆zk‖ below a certain threshold.
Theorem 2. Rk from (18) is bounded if and only if the set
Rˆαk =
{
∆ek ∈ Rn ∆ek,∆zk satisfy (10) and (11),∆ek−1 ∈ Rˆαk−1, ‖∆zk‖2 ≤ α
}
,
(28)
is bounded, where Rˆα0 = 0 ∈ Rn and α > 0.
Proof. From (13), γCov(eak) is bounded and we can simplify
our presentation by focusing on the case where γ = 0. Further-
more, for any vector v, the set { e ∈ Rn eeT 4 vvT } is
bounded if and only if the vector v is bounded. Therefore, the
set
{
e ∈ Rn eeT 4 E[eak]E[eak]T + γCov(eak)
}
will be
bounded if and only if E[eak] = ∆ek (from (12)) is bounded.
Consider attack vectors a1..k ∈ Ak. From Lemmas 1 and 2
we have that
{∆ek|a1..k ∈ Ak} ⊆ {∆ek|a1..k ∈ Ak} ⊆ {∆ek|a1..k ∈ Ak},
(29)
where we somewhat abuse the notation, by having
{∆ek|a1..k ∈ A} capture all reachable vectors ∆ek when the
system (10) is ‘driven’ by attack vectors from the set A. On
the other hand, from linearity of the system described by (10)
and (11), the sets {∆ek|‖∆zk′‖Q−1 ≤ α, k′ = 1, ..., k} and
{∆ek|‖∆zk′‖Q−1 ≤ α, k′ = 1, ..., k} are either both bounded
or both unbounded. Thus, from (29), these sets are bounded
if and only if {∆ek|a1..k ∈ Ak} is bounded.
Finally, as 1|λmax|‖∆zk‖2 ≤ ‖∆zk‖Q−1 ≤ 1|λmin|‖∆zk‖2,
where λmax, λmin are the largest and smallest, respectively,
eigenvalue of Q, the region Rˆαk will be bounded for the
constraint ‖∆zk‖Q−1 ≤ α if and only if its bounded with
a 2-norm stealthiness constraint ‖∆zk‖2 ≤ α from (28).
A. Perfectly Attackable Systems
Theorem 2 can be used to formally capture dynamical
systems for which there exists a stealthy attack sequence that
results in an unbounded state estimation error – i.e., for such
systems, given enough time, the attacker can make arbitrary
changes in the system states without risking detection.
Definition 3. A system is perfectly attackable (PA) if the
system’s reachable set R from (19) is an unbounded set.
As shown in [22], [11], for LTI systems without any addi-
tional data integrity guarantees, the set Rˆα = ⋃∞k=0 Rˆαk can
be bounded or unbounded depending on the system dynamics
and the set of compromised sensors K. From Theorem 2, this
property is preserved for the set R as well. For this reason,
we will be using the definition of Rˆα to analyze boundedness
of R, and to simplify the notation due to linearity of the
constraint we will assume that α = 1 – i.e., for this analysis
we consider the stealthiness attack constraint as
‖∆zk‖2 ≤ 1, k ∈ N0, (30)
imposed on the system Ξ from (10) and (11).
Now, the theorem below follows from [22], [11].
Theorem 3. A system from (9) is perfectly attackable if and
only if the matrix A is unstable, and at least one eigenvector v
corresponding to an unstable eigenvalue satisfies supp(Cv) ⊆
K and v is a reachable state of the system Ξ from (10), (11).
Note that [22] also uses the term unstable eigenvalue λ to
denote |λ| ≥ 1. In the next section, we show that intermittent
integrity guarantees significantly limit stealthy attacks even for
perfectly-attackable systems.
IV. STEALTHY ATTACKS IN SYSTEMS WITH
INTERMITTENT INTEGRITY ENFORCEMENT
In this section, we analyze the effects that intermittent data
integrity guarantees have on the estimation error under attack.
To formalize this notion, we start with the following definition.
Definition 4. A global intermittent data integrity enforcement
policy (µ, f, L), where µ = {tk}∞k=0 such that t0 > 1, for all
k > 0, tk−1 < tk and L = supk>0 (tk − tk−1), ensures that
atk = atk+1 = ... = atk+f−1 = 0,∀k ≥ 0.
7Furthermore, for a sensor si ∈ S , the sensor’s intermittent
data integrity enforcement policy (µi, fi, Li), where µi ={
tik
}∞
k=0
with ti0 > 1, t
i
k−1 < t
i
k for all k > 0, and
Li = supk>0
(
tik − tik−1
)
, ensures that
atik,i = atik+1,i = ... = atik+fi−1,i = 0,∀k ≥ 0.
Intuitively, an intermittent data integrity enforcement policy
for sensor si ensures that the injected attack ak,i via the sensor
will be equal to zero in at least fi consecutive points, where
the starts of these ‘blocks’ are at most Li time-steps apart.
Similarly, for a global intermittent data integrity enforcement
policy, the whole attack vector ak has to be 0 for at least f
consecutive steps, and the duration between these blocks is
bounded from above to at most L time-steps.
Global intermittent integrity enforcement is easier to model
(and analyze, as we will show in the next section). However,
compared to the use of p separate sensor’s intermittent in-
tegrity enforcements, global enforcement policies impose sig-
nificantly larger communication and computation overhead in
every time-step when data integrity is enforced. For example,
with global enforcement every sensor has to be able to com-
pute and add a MAC to its message transmitted over a shared
bus during one sampling period (which usually corresponds
to a single communication frame). In addition, since in these
systems estimation/control updates are commonly computed
once all messages are received, when the integrity is enforced
the estimator has to be able to evaluate/recompute all received
MACs before its execution for that time-period. On the other
hand, with integrity enforcement for each sensor, their MACs
can be sent and reevaluated in separate (e.g., consecutive)
sampling periods (i.e., communication frames).
Remark 4. It is worth noting that our definition of intermittent
integrity enforcement policies imposes a maximum time be-
tween integrity enforcements which, as we will show, is related
to the worst-case estimation error caused by the attacks. The
definition also captures periodic integrity enforcements when
L = tk−tk−1 for all k > 0. Finally, the definition also allows
for capturing policies with continuous integrity enforcements,
by specifying L ≤ f .
The following theorem specifies that when a global inter-
mittent integrity enforcement policy is used a stealthy attacker
cannot insert an unbounded expected state estimation error.
Theorem 4. Consider an LTI system from (1) with a global
data integrity policy (µ, f, L), where
f = min(ψ, qun), (31)
L is finite, ψ is the observability index of the (A,C) pair, and
qun denotes the number of unstable eigenvalues of A. Then
the system is not perfectly attackable.
From the above theorem, it follows that even intermittent
integrity guarantees significantly limit the damage that the
attacker could make to the system. Furthermore, the theorem
makes no assumptions about the set K of compromised
sensors; in the general case, system designers may not be able
to provide this type of guarantees during system design, and
thus no restrictions are imposed on the set, neither regarding
the number of elements or whether some sensors belong to it.
Remark 5. In our preliminary results reported in [7],
a similar formulation of Theorem 4 is used with f =
min
(
nullity(C) + 1, qun
)
. Since ψ ≤ n − rank(C) + 1
from [33], using the rank–nullity theorem it follows that ψ ≤
nullity(C) + 1, meaning that the condition from Theorem 4
is stronger than our earlier result and may further reduce the
number of integrity-enforcement points.
In the rest of the paper, we use the notation from Theorem
4 for f and qun. To show the theorem, we exploit the
following Lemma 3 and Theorem 5; the lemma states that if
stealthy attacks introduce unbounded estimation error ∆ek, the
unbounded components must belong to vector subspaces cor-
responding to unstable modes of the system (i.e., matrix A).
Lemma 3. Consider system Ξ from (10) and (11) under the
stealthiness contraint (30), and let us denote by v1, . . . ,vqun
eigenvectors and generalized eigenvectors that correspond to
unstable eigenvalues of matrix A. Then, unbounded estimation
errors ∆ek can be represented as
∆ek = α1v1 + · · ·+ αqunvqun + %k (32)
where %k =
∑n
j=qun+1
αjvj is a bounded vector, and for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ qun it holds that αi →∞ as k →∞.
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix.
Theorem 5. Consider any k ∈ N, such that k + 1 ∈ µ
(i.e., at time k + 1 an integrity enforcement block in the
policy µ starts). If ∆ek is reachable state of Ξ, and if vectors
CA∆ek,CA∆ek+1, . . . ,CA∆ek+f−1 are bounded, then
the vector ∆ek+f has to be bounded for any stealthy attack.7
Proof. From (10) and (11) it follows that
∆ek+f = A∆ek+f−1 −K∆zk+f , (33)
∆zk+f = CA∆ek+f−1 + ak+f . (34)
Since ‖K‖2 is bounded, and ‖∆zk+f‖2 ≤ 1 due to the stealthy
attack constraint (30), then ‖K∆zk+f‖2 ≤ ‖K‖2‖∆zk+f‖2
is bounded. Thus, to show that ‖∆ek+f‖2 is bounded, it is
sufficient to prove that ‖A∆ek+f−1‖2 is bounded.
Let’s assume the opposite – i.e., that ‖A∆ek+f−1‖2 is
unbounded while ‖CA∆ek‖2, . . . , ‖CA∆ek+f−1‖2 are all
bounded. From (33) it follows that
A∆ek+f−1 = Af∆ek −
f−1∑
j=1
Af−jK∆zk+j .
Given that ‖∆zk+1‖2, . . . , ‖∆zk+f−1‖2 are bounded due to
the stealthy attack requirements, in order for A∆ek+f−1 to
be unbounded, Af∆ek has to be unbounded as well.
Since CA∆ek+1 is bounded, this implies that
CA(A∆ek −K∆zk+1) has to be bounded too. However, as
7Formally, the theorem states that the subsequence {∆ek+f}(k+1)∈µ
of the sequence {∆ek}k∈N is bounded, if the subsequence
{CA∆ek,CA∆ek+1, . . . ,CA∆ek+f−1}(k+1)∈µ of the sequence
{CA∆ek}k∈N is bounded. However, to simplify our presentation and
notation, we simply refer to the vectors, instead of subsequences, as bounded.
8∆zk+1 has to be bounded due to the stealthiness condition, it
follows that CA2∆ek has to remain bounded. Similarly, we
can show that this holds up to CAf∆ek, and thus the vector
bk(f) defined as
bk(f) =

C
CA
. . .
CAf−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Of
A∆ek (35)
is bounded. Now, we consider two cases.
Case I: If f is observability index of (A,C) pair (i.e., f = ψ),
then Of has full rank, from which it follows that A∆ek (and
thus Af∆ek) has to be also bounded, which is a contradiction.
Case II: Consider f = qun, and let us use similarity transform
V on the initial system, where V is defined as in the Lemma 3
proof – i.e., V = [v1 ... vn] and we index (generalized) eigen-
vectors such that for each eigenvector vi with Li generalized
eigenvectors, vi+1, ...,vi+Li is its generalized eigenvector
chain; in addition, v1, ...,vqun are the eigenvectors (including
generalized eigenvectors) for all unstable modes of A.
Thus, the transformed system can be captured as
A˜ = V−1AV = J =
[
J1(qun×qun) 0(qun×n−qun)
0(n−qun×qun) J2(n−qun×n−qun)
]
C˜ = CV =
[
C˜1(p×qun) C˜2(p×n−qun)
]
where J is the Jordan form of A, J1 captures unstable modes
of A and the pair (A˜, C˜) is also observable.
Since Af∆ek is unbounded we have that ∆ek is unbounded
(from ‖Af∆ek‖2 ≤ ‖A‖f2‖∆ek‖2). Thus, from Lemma 3,
∆ek = V [α1 . . . αn]
T
= Vα1..n, (36)
where α1..qun =
[
α1 . . . αqun
]T
is unbounded while
α(qun+1)..n =
[
α(qun+1) . . . αqn
]T
is a bounded vector. Due
to the fact that C˜A˜j = C˜Jj =
[
C˜1J
j
1 C˜2J
j
2
]
, from (35) it
follows that
bk(f) =

C˜1 C˜2
C˜1J1 C˜2J2
. . .
C˜1J
f−1
1 C˜2J
f−1
2
Jα1..n =
=

C˜1
C˜1J1
. . .
C˜1J
f−1
1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
O˜uns,f
J1α1..qun +

C˜2
C˜2J2
. . .
C˜2J
f−1
2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
O˜sta,f
J2α(qun+1)..n.
(37)
Since bk(f) and α(qun+1)..n are bounded, from (37) the vector
b˜k(f) = O˜uns,fJ1α1..qun (38)
is also bounded. Note that O˜uns,f is effectively the observabil-
ity matrix of the (J1, C˜1) pair corresponding to the subsystem
with the qun unstable eigenvalues of A.
Fig. 3. System evolution between two consecutive endpoints of integrity
enforcement intervals.
To show that (J1, C˜1) is observable, let us assume the
opposite; thus, there exist an eigenvector v˜j of J1 such that
v˜j ∈ null(C˜1) ⊆ Rqun . Take note that J1 is a Jordan matrix,
so each of its eigenvectors has to be a projection vector ij (as
defined in Sec. I-A), where j, 1 ≤ j ≤ qun, corresponds to the
start of a Jordan block of J1. Yet this implies that C˜1ij = 0p×1
– i.e., the jth column of C˜1 and thus the jth column of C˜ are
zero vectors. However, since C˜ = CV = [Cv1 . . . Cvn],
it follows that Cvj = 0 for some j. Due to the way V is
formed and since j has to be the start index of a Jordan block
in J1, it follows that vj is an eigenvector of A. However, this
implies that vj ∈ null(C), making (A,C) pair unobservable
and contradicting our initial assumption about the system.
Therefore, (J1, C˜1) is observable meaning that O˜uns,f is
full rank. Furthermore, J1 is invertible as it contains only
unstable (i.e., non-zero) eigenvalues of the system on the
diagonal. Hence, from (38) and the fact that bk(f) is bounded
it follows that vector α1..qun has to be bounded, which
from (36) contradicts that ∆ek and Af∆ek are unbounded,
and thus concludes the proof.
Using the previous theorem, we now prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider any time-point tk+f such that
tk ∈ µ – i.e., tk is the start of an integrity enforcement block.
Thus, atk = ... = atk+f−1 = 0. From (11) it follows that
∆ztk+j = CA∆etk+j−1, j = 0, ..., f −1, and thus from (30)
‖CA∆etk+j−1‖2 ≤ 1, j = 0, ..., f − 1.
Now, from Theorem 5 it follows that the state estimation
error ∆etk+f−1 has to be bounded for any stealthy attack; this
holds for all time points at the ends of integrity enforcement
intervals. Since in the proof of Theorem 5, we have not used
any specifics of the time points, there exists a global bound on
state estimation error at the end of all integrity enforcement
periods (as illustrated in Figure 3).
Finally, consider an expected state-estimation error vector
at any time j. From Definition 4, there exists ti ∈ µ such that
j ∈
[
tˆi, tˆi + L
)
, where tˆi = ti+f (Figure 3). Now, from (10)
and (11) we have that
∆ej = A
j−tˆi∆etˆi −
j−tˆi∑
l=1
Aj−tˆi−lK∆ztˆi+l. (39)
Thus, the evolution of the expected state estimation error
vector between two time points with bounded values can be
described as evolution over a finite number of steps of a
9dynamical system with bounded inputs (since ‖∆ztˆi+l‖2 ≤ 1);
from the triangle and Cauchy-Schwarz inequalities it follows
‖∆ej‖2 ≤ ‖A‖j−tˆi2 ‖∆etˆi‖2 +
j−tˆi∑
l=1
‖A‖j−tˆi−l2 ‖K‖2. (40)
Hence, the expected estimation error vector ∆ej is bounded
for any j, and the system is not perfectly attackable.
Theorem 4 assumes that the attacker has the full knowledge
of the system’s integrity enforcement policy – i.e., at which
time-points integrity enforcements will occur. As we illustrate
in Section VI, this allows the attacker to plan attacks that
maximize the error, while ensuring stealthiness of the attack
by reducing the state estimation errors to the levels that will
not trigger detection during integrity enforcement intervals. On
the other hand, if the attacker does not have the knowledge
of µ (i.e., if (s)he is not aware of the time points in which
integrity enforcements would occur), the integrity enforcement
requirements can be additionally relaxed; as the attacker does
not know when enforcements occur, (s)he has to ensure that
if at any future point (including the next time-step) malicious
data cannot be injected, the residue would still remain below
the threshold (30). Thus, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 6. Any LTI system from (1) with a global data
integrity policy (µ, 1, L) (i.e., with f = 1) is not perfectly
attackable for any stealthy attacker that does not know the
time points µ when data integrity is enforced.
Proof. First, note that the sequence CA∆ek cannot be
bounded if the attacker wants to introduce an unbounded state
estimation error. If it was bounded, from (11) and (30) it
would follow that ak is always bounded; this in turn would
imply that the system from (10) has bounded inputs, which
since matrix (A−KCA) is stable (K is Kalman gain) would
imply that ∆ek cannot diverge – the reachable set R can not
be unbounded.
On the other hand, let us assume that the system is perfectly
attackable – i.e., the expected state estimation error can be
unbounded. Then, from our previous argument it follows that
CA∆ek is unbounded and thus we can find k and ∆ek such
that ‖CA∆ek‖2 > 1. Then, if global data integrity is enforced
only once at the time-step k+1, from (11) it would follow that
‖∆zk+1‖ = ‖CA∆ek‖2 > 1, which violates the stealthiness
requirement from (30).
Theorems 4 and 5 consider a worst-case scenario without
any constraints or assumptions about the set of compromised
sensors K (e.g., that less than q sensors are compromised). Yet,
some knowledge about the set K may be available at design-
time. For instance, for MitM attacks some sensors cannot be in
set K, such as on-board sensors that do not communicate over
a network to deliver information to the estimator, or sensors
with built-in continuous data authentication. In these cases, the
number of integrity enforcements can be reduced.
Corollary 2. Consider a system from (1) with a global data
integrity policy (µ, f, L), where f = min(ψ, q∗un), ψ is the
observability index of (A,C), and q∗un denotes the number
of unstable eigenvalues λi of A for which the corresponding
eigenvector vi satisfies supp (Cvi) ∈ K. Then the system is
not perfectly attackable.
Proof. The proof directly follows the proof of Theorem 4,
with the only difference that all αi →∞ from Lemma 3 also
have to correspond to the unstable eigenvectors vi satisfying
that supp (Cvi) ∈ K; otherwise, consider αi → ∞, from a
decomposition of a ‘large’ ∆ek such that ‖Cαivi‖2 → ∞
and supp (Cvi) /∈ K. Then the components of the residue
∆zk+1 whose indicies are in supp (Cvi) but not in K
(i.e., Psupp(Cvi)\K∆zk+1) cannot be influenced by the attack
signal ak+1, meaning that their large values due to αi → ∞
cannot be compensated for by the attack signal, and thus will
violate the stealthiness condition (30).
Let us recall Definition 1 that introduced Ak, the set of
all stealthy attacks up to time k – it only requires that attack
vector a1..k ∈ Ak satisfies the stealthiness conditions up to
time k. Thus, as shown in the proof of Theorem 4, the attacker
applying attack a1..k ∈ Ak may have to violate the stealthiness
constraint during the next integrity enforcement block, since
for those time-points t when integrity is enforced at = 0. As
the attacker’s goal is to remain stealthy even during integrity
enforcements, we consider policy-aware stealthy attack sets.
Definition 5. For an integrity enforcement policy (µ, f, L),
the set of all policy-aware stealthy attacks up to time k is
Aµk =
{
a1..k
a1..k′ ∈ Ak′ ,
k′ = min
{
t | (t− f + 1 ∈ µ) ∧ (t ≥ k)}
}
.
Intuitively, the attacker will always plan attacks at least until
the end of next integrity enforcement block (captured by k′),
while keeping the probability of detection as low. Thus, we
also need to modify the definition of the k-reachable regionRk
(Def. 2), as it depends on the employed set of stealthy attacks.
Definition 6. The policy aware k-reachable region Rµk of the
state estimation error under the attack (i.e., eak) is the set
Rµk =
{
e ∈ Rn ee
T 4 E[eak]E[eak]T + γCov(eak),
eak = e
a
k(a1..k), a1..k ∈ Aµk
}
.
(41)
Furthermore, the global policy-aware reachable region Rµ of
the state estimation error eak is the set
Rµ =
∞⋃
k=0
Rµk . (42)
The above definition introduces a region that can be reached
by an attacker that both considers past behavior and plans
accordingly into the future to avoid being detected. Since
Aµk ⊆ Ak, it directly follows that Rµ ⊆ R, and the bound-
edness property holds. Finally, note that when no integrity
enforcements are used it follows that Rµ ≡ R.
1) Guarantees with Sensor-wise Integrity Enforcement:
Due to space constraint, we now consider the case where the
system has one unstable eigenvalue λ1 with the corresponding
eigenvector v1, but the result can be generalized. Also, let’s
assume that all sensor integrity enforcement policies use
fi = 1 and have tik = t
i+1
k −1 for all k and all i = 1, ..., p−1
10
(i.e., sensors enforce integrity in consecutive points, first s1,
then s2, etc); this also implies all Li are equal.
It can be shown that the system is not perfectly attackable
in this case. The proof follows the ideas from the proofs of
Theorems 4 and 5. If s1 integrity is enforced at t1k = j, that
would mean that ∆zj,1 = P{s1}CA∆ej−1= P{s1}C˜Jα1..n
as in Theorem 5, and thus ‖P{s1}C˜Jα1..n‖2 ≤ 1. From
Lemma 3, if ∆ej−1 is unbounded, only α1 → ∞, and thus
J1 as in (37) is scalar. To account for this, P{s1}Cv1λ1α1
has to be zero, which implies that v1 ∈ null(P{s1}C).
Similarly, it can be shown that from ∆zj,i, it follows that
v1 ∈ null(P{si}C) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This can be represented as
Cv1 = 0, which since λ1 6= 0 implies that v1 ∈ null(C).
This is a contradiction because (A,C) is observable from our
initial assumptions.
V. ANALYSIS AND DESIGN OF SAFE INTEGRITY
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES
In the previous section, we have shown that with even
intermittent integrity enforcements a stealthy attacker cannot
introduce an unbounded state estimation error, irrelevant of
the set of compromised sensors K. However, we still need
to provide methods to evaluate whether a specific integrity
enforcement policy ensures the desired estimation performance
(i.e., state estimation error) even in the presence of attacks.
Furthermore, our goal is to also provide a design framework to
derive integrity enforcement policies that ensure that the state
estimation errors remain within a desired region even under
attack. Thus, in this section, we introduce a computationally
efficient method to achieve this based on an efficient estimation
of the reachable region Rµk from (41) for systems with
intermittent data integrity enforcements.
A. Reachable State Estimation Errors with Intermittent In-
tegrity Enforcements
Consider an LTI system from (1), (9) with a global data
integrity policy (µ, f, L). As in Definition 5, we use a1..k =
[(a1)
T ... (ak)
T ]T ∈ Rpk to capture attack vectors up to
step k, where supp(aj) = K˜j , j = 1, ..., k, and
K˜j =
{ ∅, j − i ∈ µ, for some i, 0 ≤ i < f,
K, otherwise
Here, K˜j captures the set of compromised sensor measure-
ments received in step j – i.e., if data integrity is enforced at
step j then no measurements are compromised. In addition,
let us define supp(a1..k) = Qk ⊆ {1, ..., pk}; note that Qk
effectively captures information about the applied integrity
enforcement policy, and
|Qk| = |Qk−1|+ |K˜k| =
k∑
i=1
|K˜i|. (43)
From (10) and (11), ∆ek and ∆zk can be captured in a non-
recursive form as
∆ek = −
[
(A−KCA)k−1K ... K
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mk
a1..k
∆zk =
[ −CAMk−1 I ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nk
a1..k
(44)
To incorporate the information about the sparsity of the attack
vector, we use suitable projections onto Qk and K˜1, ..., K˜k,
which satisfy PQk = BlckDiag(PK˜1 , ...,PK˜k). In addition,
it holds that P†K˜j = P
T
K˜j , since PK˜jP
T
K˜j = I|K˜j |, for j =
1, ..., k, and thus P†Qk = P
T
Qk . Then, (44) can be restated as
∆ek = −
[
(A−KCA)k−1KP†K˜1 ... KP
†
K˜k
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MkPQ†
k
PQka1..k
∆zk =
[
−CAMk−1PQ†k−1 P
†
K˜k
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
NkPQ†
k
PQka1..k
(45)
with matrices MkPQ†k and NkPQ†k capturing information
about the time steps in which data integrity is enforced.
For the general form of the detection function gk it may
not be possible to obtain a simple analytical solution for the
regions Rµk and Rµ. Therefore, in this section we will focus
on a specific detection function employed by Sequential Prob-
ability Ratio Test (SPRT) detectors. However, the presented
method can be extended in similar fashion to cover other
detectors, such as cumulative sum and generalized likelihood
test. SPRT observes two hypothesis, H0 : zk ∼ N (0,Q) and
H1 : zk 6∼ N (0,Q). One issue that arises from using SPRT
is its non-linearity, given that it accumulates the data until
decision is reached, after which observation window is reset. In
addition, the exact distribution for zk under H1 is not known
since the mean of compromised zk (i.e., zak) changes over
time, which causes issues with implementation of SPRT as it
requires known distributions without time-varying parameters.
To address the first issue, we assume that the attacker attempts
to stay between decision thresholds, where the upper threshold
is denoted by the previously introduced h; the attacker never
goes below lower decision threshold, i.e., H0 is never ob-
served, as that would imply greater constraints on the attacker,
effectively resulting in attacks that exert a lower estimation
error. Thus, under these assumptions, the stopping time of
SPRT in a compromised system is arbitrarily large.
To address the second challenge (i.e., unknown distribution
for zak), we approximate the detection function by initializing
log-likelihood ratio Λk ≡ 0 when the system is not under
the attack, as previously proposed in e.g., [12], [10]; this
will ensure that gk does not go above the threshold without
attack. Consequently, from these assumptions, it follows that
the detector function of SPRT detector can be captured as
gk = gk−1 + Λk =
k∑
τ=1
(
1
2
zTτ Q
−1zτ + log c
√
(2pi)pdet(Q)) =
=
1
2
k∑
τ=1
(zTτ Q
−1zτ ) + k log c
√
(2pi)pdet(Q)
(46)
where Λk = log
fa(zk)
f(zk)
, fa and f are probability density
functions of the residuals under the attack and in regular op-
eration respectively, and c = e−
p
2 /
√
(2pi)pdet(Q) is a design
constant initialized such that log-likelihood ratio Λk ≡ 0.Thus,
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in this case the attacker’s stealthiness constraint from (16)
(i.e., P (gak > h) ≤ P (gk > h) + ε) can be captured as
P
 k∑
τ=1
(zaτ
TQ−1zaτ )> 2h + kp
≤ ε+P
 k∑
τ=1
(zTτ Q
−1zτ )> 2h + kp

Given that these two sums have the non-central χ2 (left) and
(central) χ2 distributions, from Theorem 1 and the proof of
Lemma 1 it follows that the above constraint is equivalent to√√√√ k∑
τ=1
‖∆zτ‖2Q−1 ≤ αχ2(ε, kp, 2h+ kp). (47)
On the other hand, from (45) it follows that
k∑
τ=1
‖∆zτ‖2Q−1 =
k∑
τ=1
∆zTτ Q
−1∆zτ =
=
k∑
τ=1
(PQka1..k)
T
[NτPQ†τ 0p×(|Qk|−|Qτ |)]
TQ−1
[NτPQ†τ 0p×(|Qk|−|Qτ |)]PQka1..k.
Hence, from (47), the attacker’s stealthiness constraint under
considered integrity enforcement policy µ can be captured as
‖PQka1..k‖Θk ≤ αχ2(ε, kp, 2h+ kp), (48)
where
Θk =
k∑
τ=1
[NτP
†
Qτ 0p×(|Qk|−|Qτ |)]
TQ−1[NτP†Qτ 0p×(|Qk|−|Qτ |)].
(49)
For the above matrix Θk, the following property holds.
Lemma 4. For any k ≥ 1, the matrix Θk is positive definite.
Proof. We start with the case when k = 1. From Definition 4,
data integrity is not enforced at k = 1 and thus Q1 = K˜1 = K.
Due to the way projection matrices are formed, we have that
P†TQ1P
†
Q1 = I|Q1|  0 and Θ1 = [P
†
Q1 ]
TQ−1[P†Q1 ].
Since Q  0, it follows that Θ1  0 as well.
Now, consider the case k ≥ 2 and let us assume that Θk−1
is positive definite. From (49) it follows that
Θk =
[
Θk−1 0|Qk−1|×|K˜k|
0|K˜k|×|Qk−1| 0|K˜k|×|K˜k|
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ˜k−1
+[NkP
†
Qk ]
TQ−1[NkP
†
Qk ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ˜k
(50)
and we consider the following two cases.
Case I: There does not exist i, such that 0 ≤ i < f and
k− i ∈ µ; this implies that integrity is not enforced at the step
k and K˜k = K. Because both Θk−1  0 and Q  0, both ad-
dends in (50) are positive semidefinite matrices, and Θk  0.
In addition, since Θk−1 is positive definite by assumption,
null
(
Θ˜k−1
)
= R
(
[0|K˜k|×|Qk−1| I|K˜k|]
T
)
. Furthermore,
from (45), we have (51). Given that (P†K˜k)
T
Q−1P†K˜k  0,
it follows that null
(
Θ˜k
)
cannot have non-zero vectors from
R
(
[0|K˜k|×|Qk−1| I|K˜k|]
T
)
. Therefore,
null(Θ˜k) ∩ null(Θ˜k−1) = {0}. (52)
Now, assume that there exists a non-zero vector v such that
v ∈ null(Θk) – i.e., (Θ˜k + Θ˜k−1)v = 0, and thus
vT Θ˜kv = −vT Θ˜k−1v.
However, since v cannot be in the null-spaces of both matrices
due to (52), and Θ˜k−1 and Θ˜k are both positive semidefinite,
this is a clear contradiction. Consequently, Θk = Θ˜k + Θ˜k−1
null(Θk) = {0}, and since Θk is a positive semidefinite
matrix it holds that Θk  0.
Case II: There exists i, such that 0 ≤ i < f and k − i ∈ µ;
i.e., integrity is enforced at the step k. Thus, |K˜k| = 0, so
Θ˜k−1 = Θk−1 is positive definite. Thus, since Θ˜k  0, it
follows that Θk = Θ˜k + Θ˜k−1 is positive definite.
Now, the specification of the stealthiness condition
from (48) allows us to obtain the following result.
Theorem 7. The k-reachable region Rµk under a global data
integrity enforcement policy (µ, f, L) can be represented as
Rµk =
{
eak|eakeakT 4 α2χ2 [MkP †Qk 0]Θ−1t [MkP
†
Qk 0]
T
+ γΣ
}
(53)
where α2χ2 = α
2
χ2(ε, tp, 2h + tp), t is the first end of an
integrity enforcement block following k – i.e., the earliest
time point such that t − f + 1 ∈ µ and k ≤ t, and
0 = 0|Qk|×(|Qt|−|Qk|).
Proof. Consider the stealthiness constraints (48) at time t,
which can be written as
α2χ2(ε, tp, 2h+ tp)− (PQta1..t)TΘtPQta1..t ≥ 0. (54)
Now, using Schur complement and Lemma 4, we obtain[
Θt
−1 PQta1..t
(PQta1..t)
T
α2χ2(ε, tp, 2h+ tp)
]
< 0 (55)
As the left hand side of (55) is positive semidefinite, when
multiplied by a matrix from the left, and its transpose from
the right, this product will also be positive semidefinite. If we
use the projection matrix P{1,...,k,t+1} for this, we effectively
reduce the matrix from (55) by removing pairs of rows and
columns corresponding to ak+1..t. Thus, we obtain that[
[I|Qk| 0]Θt
−1[I|Qk| 0]
T PQka1..k
(PQka1..k)
T
α2χ2(ε, tp, 2h+ tp)
]
< 0
(56)
where 0 = 0|Qk|×(|Qt|−|Qk|). Furthermore, with condi-
tion (56) we need to compute only single Θt−1 for all points
between integrity enforcement blocks, as constraints for prior
attacks (i.e., time points before t) directly follow from (56).
The LMI in (57) follows from (56) as it forms a quadratic
representation. We use this specific matrix as it allow us to
argue about the stealthiness condition using ∆ek rather than
a1..k. Using (45) and Schur complement once again, we have
[MkP
†
Qk 0]Θ
−1
t [(MkP
†
Qk 0)]
T − 1
α2χ2
∆ek∆ek
T < 0,
(58)
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Θ˜k =
(CAMk−1P†Qk−1)TQ−1CAMk−1P†Qk−1 (CAMk−1P†Qk−1)TQ−1P†K˜k
(P†K˜k)
T
Q−1CAMk−1P
†
Qk−1 (P
†
K˜k)
T
Q−1P†K˜k
 (51)
[
−MkP†Qk 0n×1
01×|Qk| 1
][
[I 0]Θt
−1[I 0]T PQka1..k
(PQka1..k)
T
α2χ2(ε, tp, 2h+ tp)
][
−MkP†Qk 0n×1
01×|Qk| 1
]T
< 0⇐⇒
⇐⇒
MkP†Qk [I 0]Θt−1[I 0]T (MkP†Qk)T −MkP†QkPQka1..k
−(PQka1..k)T (MkP†Qk)
T
α2χ2(ε, tp, 2h+ tp)
 < 0. (57)
where α2χ2 = α
2
χ2(ε, tp, 2h + tp). Hence, from (58) and the
definition of Rµk from (41) , as well as (12) and the fact that
Cov[eak] = Σ, we finally obtain that (53) holds.
The representation of the reachable set from (53) can be
simplified further. Let’s define Yk as
Yk = α
2
χ2(ε, tp, 2h+tp)[MkP
†
Qk 0]Θ
−1
t [MkP
†
Qk 0]
T
+γΣ.
(59)
Then (53) is equivalent to Yk−eakeakT < 0, and thus by using
Schur complement we obtain an alternative representation of
the k-reachable regions as
Rµk = {eak|eakTY−1k eak 4 1}. (60)
for the positive definite matrix Yk defined in (59). The above
representation can be exploited for efficient computation of
the reachable-regions.
Furthermore, as we described in Section II-B, the attacker’s
goal is to maximize the expected state estimation error
E[eak] = ∆ek. From the above discussion, the following
corollary directly holds by considering the case when γ = 0.
Corollary 3. A any time k, the maximal norm of the expected
state estimation error eak caused by the attack satisfies
max ‖E[eak]‖2 =
1√
λmax(Y˜k)
, (61)
where λmax(Y˜k) denotes the largest eigenvalue of the ma-
trix Y˜k = α2χ2(ε, tp, 2h+ tp)[MkP
†
Qk 0]Θ
−1
t [MkP
†
Qk 0]
T
,
and t is the next end of integrity enforcement block – i.e., the
earliest time point such that t− f + 1 ∈ µ and k ≤ t.
The above corollary provides a very efficient way to evaluate
worst-case effects of attacks when an intermittent data integrity
enforcement policy is used. By quantifying degradation of the
expected state estimation error in the presence of attacks we
can analyze the impact of the integrity enforcement policy on
limiting the attacker, which can then be used for design of
suitable integrity enforcement policies.
B. Design of Periodic Integrity Enforcement Policies
For policy design, it is necessary to be able to evaluate
impact of an integrity enforcement policy µ, not only on reach-
able regions Rµk , for any k, but even more importantly on Rµ
from (42). To achieve this, we have to obtain the terminating
value t from Theorem 7, or equivalently from (60), such that
the reachability analysis can be completed afterRµt is obtained
– i.e., for which Rµ = Rµ1..t, where Rµ1..t =
⋃t
k=1Rµk . In the
general case, the analysis may never terminate, depending on
the particular policy (µ, f, L). Therefore, to simplify the anal-
ysis, in this section we focus on periodic integrity enforcement
policies introduced in Remark 4.
For a periodic integrity enforcement policy (µ, f, L), con-
sider t1 and t2 = t1 + L time points at which consecutive
integrity enforcement blocks end – i.e., t1 − f + 1 ∈ µ and
t2−f+1 ∈ µ. From the proof of Theorem 7, if the stealthiness
requirements from the condition in (55) are satisfied at any
time t ∈ µ, then they are satisfied for all k < t, since (56)
follows from (55). Given that at1−f+1 = ... = at1 = 0
and at2−f+1 = ... = at2 = 0, and that the stealthiness
requirements remain consistent throughout the analysis, it
follows that the evolution of the estimation error between
two consecutive integrity enforcement blocks will depend only
on E[eat1 ] = ∆et1 and E[e
a
t2 ] = ∆et2 , or more specificallyRµt1 and Rµt2 . Thus, if Rµt2 ⊆ Rµt1 and Rµ1..t2 ⊆ Rµ1..t1 , then
no new estimation error values can be reached after time t2
and the terminating time for the reachability analysis can be
t1, since after time t2 as well as after all following ends of
integrity enforcement blocks the state estimation errors would
start from a subset of the error values from Rµt1 . In addition,
when the above terminating condition is satisfied, the global
reachable region of the state estimation error can be obtained
as Rµ = ⋃∞k=1Rµk = ⋃t1k=1Rµk = Rµ1..t1 .
Consequently, using Algorithm 1 we can compute a pe-
riodic integrity enforcement policy that maximizes L (i.e.,
reduces the integrity enforcement rate) while limiting the
attacker’s influence. Specifically, the algorithm will result in
the enforcement policy that ensures that the state of reachable
estimation errors does not contain points outside the set of safe
(i.e., acceptable) errors Rea . In our evaluations in the next
section, we define Rea using a threshold ‖∆emax‖2 for the
maximal 2-norm of the expected state estimation error due to
attacks. Thus, the safety condition in Line 18 of the algorithm
is mapped into max(‖ea1‖max, . . . , ‖eat ‖max) ≥ ‖∆emax‖2,
where ‖eak‖max = max ‖E[eak]‖2 as computed in (61).
Finally, while we do not provide any guarantees that Al-
gorithm 1 will always terminate, for all analyzed systems,
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Algorithm 1 Procedure for design of periodic integrity en-
forcement policies.
Inputs: System model, safe reachable region Rea for the state
estimation error ea
1: Enforcement distance L = 0
2: repeat
3: L = L+ 1
4: Form policy (µ, f, L) such that distance between con-
secutive elements in µ is L and t0 = L
5: Assign t = 0 and the reachable region R1..t = ∅
6: repeat
7: told = t
8: R1..told = R1..t
9: t = min{t′|t′ ∈ µ ∧ t′ > told}
10: Compute Ntold+1, ...,Nt, Mtold+1, ...,Mt from (44)
11: Compute Θt from (49)
12: Compute α(ε, tp, 2h+ tp)
13: for k = told + 1, . . . , t do
14: Compute Rµk using (60)
15: R1..t = R1..t ∪Rµk
16: end for
17: until R1..t ⊆ R1..told and Rt ⊆ Rtold
18: until R1..told \ Rea 6= ∅
19: Accept policy (µ, f, L− 1)
including the case studies from the next section, the condition
in Line 17 was always eventually satisfied. Therefore, for all
considered systems we have been able to use the algorithm
to obtain periodic integrity enforcement policies that ensure
desired estimation performance even in the presence of attacks.
VI. CASE STUDIES
In this section, on automotive case studies we illustrate how
intermittent data integrity enforcements can ensure satisfiable
control performance even in the presence of attacks. For both
studies, sensor values are transmitted over an internal vehicle’s
network, such as commonly used CAN bus. Note that in [14],
we provide additional automotive case-studies (and the overall
scheduling framework) for intermittent authentication of CAN-
bus messages from system sensors, and in [15] we show bene-
fits of intermittent authentication on vehicle’s ECU scheduling.
A. Case Study: Vehicle Trajectory Following
We start with the model used in [9] to describe vulnerabili-
ties and potential attacks on autonomous systems adapted for
two-axis tracking; we obtain the following discretized models
(with sampling period of 0.01s) for each axis
Ad =
[
1 0.01
0 1
]
Bd =
[
0.0001
0.01
]
Cd =
[
1 0
0 1
]
(62)
Assume that the attacker can modify the values from all
sensors. The system is perfectly attackable as the matrix Ad
is unstable and supp(Cv) ∈ K, since K = S.
We consider the largest additive estimation error on po-
sition to be 0.5 m and on speed to be 0.5 ms , resulting in
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the maximal estimation error for vehicle tracking; without
integrity enforcements, the attacker forces the system outside of the safe range
in 4 steps.
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Fig. 5. Maximal estimation error in the presence of attacks on all sensors for
vehicle-tracking case study with three different integrity enforcement policies
with f = 1 and periods L = 20, 30, 35.
‖∆emax‖2 = 0.7. We also set such that the probability of
false positive from (8) to β = 1.5%, and additional probability
of detection introduced by the attacker from (16) to ε = 0.1%.
Without integrity enforcements, the attacker could force the
state estimation error above ‖∆emax‖2 threshold after 4 steps,
as shown in Figure 4. We considered three periodic integrity
enforcement policies with f = 1 as specified in conditions of
Theorem 4, and periods L = 20, 30 and 35, denoted by µ20,
µ30, and µ35 respectively. Using results from Section V, we
show that the first two policies are safe, while the third policy
can violate the ‖∆emax‖2 threshold – Figure 5 illustrates the
evolution of the maximal estimation errors for each policy.
Finally, we evaluat the effects of intermittent integrity guar-
antees for trajectory following on a circular path with 100 m
radius, at speed of 3.14 ms . Figure 6 shows results of 200 s
long simulations, with attacks starting at 100 s. As illustrated,
when integrity is enforced on less than 3.4% of messages, i.e.,
when µ30 is employed, we have strong control performance
guarantees in the presence of attacks on all vehicle sensors.
B. Degraded Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (dCACC)
Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) employs
communication to obtain smaller following distance and better
platooning stability than standard Adaptive Cruise Control.
To achieve this, each vehicle is equipped witha lidar and
acceleration measurement sent from the preceding vehicle.
However, when acceleration data is not available CACC needs
to switch to dCACC, that is based only on local vehicle
measurements. In this mode, Singer acceleration model is used
to estimate acceleration of the preceding vehicle [28] – i.e.,
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(a) State Estimates for system under stealthy attack,
without integrity enforcement policies
(b) State estimates under stealthy attack with in-
tegrity enforcement policies.
(c) Zoomed section of the Figure 6(b).
Fig. 6. State estimation of the tracked vehicle trajectory - without integrity enforcements a stealthy attacker can introduce a significant estimation error in
a short period of time. However, even with intermittent integrity enforcement, the attack effects are negligible. Duration of the simulation is 200 s and the
attack starts at 100 s.
d˙v˙
a˙
 =
0 −1 00 0 1
0 0 − 1τ

dv
a
+
00
1
 [u] (63)
y =
[
1 0 0
0 1 0
]dv
a
 . (64)
Here, d denotes the distance of the vehicle from the preceding
vehicle, v is its speed – both computed from lidar measure-
ments and transmitted over the bus, a is the acceleration,
u is the control input, while τ = 0.8 represents maneuver
time constant of the preceding vehicle [28]. We focus on the
cases when the attacker compromises all car sensors, making
the system perfectly attackable. We set maximal estimation
error to be 0.5m on position, 3.3ms on speed, and 0.3
m
s2 on
acceleration, resulting in ‖∆emax‖2 = 3.351.
As in trajectory tracking, we assume ε = 0.1%, and
β = 0.35%. Since observability index ψ = 2 and number of
unstable eigenvalues of A is 2, then f = 2. For periodic policy
with L = 20 we obtain the maximal reachable estimation
errors in the presence of stealthy attacks as presented in Fig-
ure 7. In addition, visual representation of reachable regions
with this policy in comparison to a system without integrity
enforcement is shown in Figure 8. These results illustrate that
even with 10% authenticated messages the system ensures
satisfiable performance under false-date injection attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have focused on the problem of network-
based attacks on standard linear state estimators. We have
considered systems with Kalman filter-based estimators and
a general type of residual-based intrusion detectors, covering
widely used detectors such as χ2 and SPRT. For these systems,
we have studied effects of intermittent data integrity enforce-
ments, such as the use of message authentication codes, on
control performance in the presence of attacks. We have shown
that when integrity of sensor measurements is enforced only
intermittently, a stealthy attacker cannot insert an unbounded
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Fig. 7. Evolution of maximal estimation error for dCACC. If we can enforce
integrity on two sensor values after every twenty unsecured sensor values, the
system remains under the specified safety threshold.
Fig. 8. Reachable state estimation errors in the presence of stealthy attacks
for dCACC in steps k = 11 and k = 22 with and without data integrity
enforcement. Without integrity enforcement, the size of reachable regions
keeps increasing, while when integrity is being enforced with policy L = 20
and f = 2, estimation error evolves as in Figure 7, and the attacker is
contained between red and blue ellipsoids.
state estimation error. In addition, we have introduced a frame-
work that facilitates both evaluation and design of these inter-
mittent policies by providing analysis of the reachable state
estimation errors in the presence of stealthy attacks. Although
the framework has been developed for systems that employ
SPRT detectors, the presented techniques can be extended
for detectors from the general class described in Section II.
Finally, on three automotive case studies, we have highlighted
how devastating stealthy false-data injection attacks can be,
and how with the use of intermittent integrity enforcement
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we can ensure desired control performance with a significant
reduction in the communication and computation overhead.
The presented method to analyze the effects of intermittent
use of authentication can also provide the foundation for opti-
mal resource allocation in systems where several control loops
share communication and computation resources. Although we
present some initial results in [14] for bandwidth allocation
over a shared network, a more systematic approach to optimal
resource allocation with strong Quality-of-Control guarantees
in the presence of attacks is an avenue for future work.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof. From (10) and (11), the system Ξ can be described as
∆ek = A∆ek−1 −K∆zk (65)
Thus, due to the stealthiness constraint (30), from perspective of
estimation error ∆ek the system Ξ is effectively an unstable system
with bounded input ∆zk. To show that when the estimation error
becomes unbounded, the unbounded parts of the vector would belong
to vector subspaces corresponding to unstable modes of A we start
by capturing ∆ek in a non-recursive form as
∆ek = −
k−1∑
i=0
AiK∆zk−i, (66)
since ∆e0 = 0. Also, since eigenvectors and generalized eigenvectors
v1, . . . ,vn of A span Rn, we can decompose the estimation error as
∆ek =
n∑
i=1
αivi, αi ∈ R, i = 1, ..., n. (67)
Decomposing K∆zk−i with the same base vectors v1, ...vn ∈ Rn,
we obtain that
−K∆zk−i = φk−i,1v1 + · · ·+ φk−i,nvn, φk−i,j ∈ R, (68)
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where for i = 0, ...k − 1 and j = 1, ...n, due to (30) it holds that
φk−i,j ∈ R are bounded – specifically, for V = [v1 . . .vn] ∈ Rn×n
|φk−i,j | ≤ φmax,i = max‖z‖2=1 i
T
i V
−1(Kz),
where V is invertible as v1, ...,vn are linearly independent, and ii ∈
Rn is the projection vector with 1 in ith position and zeros otherwise.
Thus, from (66), (67), and (68), we have
n∑
i=1
αivi =
k−1∑
j=0
n∑
i=1
φk−j,iA
j−1vi. (69)
We now consider two cases, although Case II is more general (and
captures Case I as well), its notation is quite cumbersome.
Case I – When A is diagonizable, Avi = λivi holds, and thus
n∑
i=1
αivi =
k−1∑
j=0
n∑
i=1
φk−j,iλ
j−1
i vi. (70)
Since vi are linearly independent, we obtain
|αi| = |
k−1∑
j=0
φk−j,iλ
j−1| ≤ φmax,i
k−1∑
j=0
|λi|j−1, (71)
The right side of (71) will converge when k → ∞ if and only if
|λi| < 1, which implies that αi can have arbitrarily large values
only if associated with an eigenvector corresponding to an unstable
eigenvalues, while αi associated with stable eigenvalues is bounded.
Case II – In general A may not be diagonizable, and we consider
generalized eigenvectors. Specifically, we index (generalized) eigen-
vectors such that each eigenvector vi with generalized eigenvectors,
vi+1, . . . ,vi+Li form its generalized eigenvector chain of length Li
– i.e., for 0 ≤ l ≤ Li, vi+l represents l-th element of the chain.
By representing A = VJV−1 and ∆ek = V[α1 . . . αn]T , where
V = [v1 . . . vn] and J is Jordan form of A, we can exploit the
property of Jordan block matrices [5], to obtain following expression
Ajvi+Li =
min(j,Li)∑
l=0
(
j
l
)
λj−li vi+Li−l.
This allows us to represent (69) as
n∑
i=1
αivi =
k−1∑
j=0
n∑
i=1
min(j,Li)∑
l=0
φk−j,i
(
j
l
)
λj−li vi+Li−l, (72)
where Li depends on the particular i that is being summed over. Let
Lfol(i) denote the number of followers of vi inside its eigenvector
chain (e.g., if vi is an eigenvector Lfol(i) = Li). Again, since vi are
linearly independent, we obtain
|αi| = |
k−1∑
j=0
min(j,Lfol(i))∑
l=0
φk−j,i+l
(
j
l
)
λj−li | ≤
≤
k−1∑
j=0
min(j,Lfol(i))∑
l=0
|φk−j,i+l|
(
j
l
)
|λi|j−l
≤
k−1∑
j=0
min(j,Lfol(i))∑
l=0
φmaxj
Lfol(i) |λi|j−l
≤
{
(Lfol(i) + 1)φmax
∑k−1
j=0 j
Lfol(i) |λi|j , |λi| ≥ 1
(Lfol(i) + 1)φmax
∑k−1
j=0 j
Lfol(i) |λi|j−Lfol(i) , |λi| < 1
(73)
where φmax = max{φmax,1, . . . , φmax,n}. If we use the ratio test
for convergence of series [2] when |λi| < 1, we obtain
lim
j→∞
(j + 1)Lfol(i) |λi|j+1−Lfol(i)
jLfol(i) |λi|j−Lfol(i)
=
= lim
j→∞
|λi|( j + 1
j
)Lfol(i) = |λi|.
Thus, since |λi| < 1 by assumption, the series converges, and all αi
that correspond to stable eigenvalues have to be bounded. Similarly,
the ratio test can be used to show that the series is divergent when
|λi| > 1. Divergence of series for |λi| = 1 can be shown by
substitution. Namely, from (73), when |λi| = 1, it follows that
(Lfol(i)+1)φmax
k−1∑
j=0
jLfol(i) |λi|j = (Lfol(i)+1)φmax
k−1∑
j=0
jLfol(i) ,
which given that Lfol(i) ∈ N0, implies that the series also diverges
for |λi| = 1, and thus concludes the proof.
